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Abstract. To gain insight into the use of the VSNU research quality evaluations (since 1993) in
the practice of research and of institutional management in Dutch universities, interviews were
held in eight cases evaluated in the first year of this procedure. The main conclusions are that
use of these research evaluations is universal, both ‘instrumentally’ (in decisions directly based
on the judgements) and ‘incrementally’ (in decision-making processes not directly linked to the
evaluation). Underlying this is ‘conceptual use’: an important change in deans’ and rectors’
views of their role in managing research, which they now can realise, because the VSNU
research evaluations give them, for the first time, solidly legitimate arguments on which to
base strategic decisions. Next to use, other effects can be discerned within universities, pointing
to a growing dependency of researchers on managers, necessitating amongst others ever more
consciously strategic publication behaviour. Whether quality of research improves in this way,
cannot be answered here, but certainly it is more difficult for academics not to engage in
research.
Introduction: research and evaluation
Ever since science1 became a social activity in the seventeenth century, eval-
uations of research outcomes have played a role in the control of what was
accepted as valid knowledge and in the distribution of scarce resources: first
of all reputation, but also awards and – increasingly – money. At first, this was
practically completely a matter of inter-collegial or peers, control. Especially
since the Second World War governments started to realise the essential role
of scientific development for the national capacity, in military and econom-
ic terms. In recent decades this trend was strengthened by the tremendous
growth of higher education systems, leading – in Europe more than in the
United States – to ever higher governmental expenditures for the university
system. But apparently a ceiling of public expenditure was hit in the 1980s
in this respect in many European countries: governments no longer were pre-
pared to expand their outlays for teaching and research in higher education
unconditionally – or not at all (Van Vught 1995).
For this reason, and for other reasons such as the growing desire for trans-
parency of government expenditure and effectiveness in all areas of policy
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(cf. among many others Van Vught and Westerheijden 1994), more extensive
systems of evaluation were developed in higher education systems in many
countries, integrated within the ‘steering strategy’ of the government instead
of being mainly self-regulative peer control. This is quite different from sci-
ence policy in general, in which setting of priorities is seen as the problem to
be solved, while apparently trusting that judging quality of research is unprob-
lematic (e.g., Van der Meulen, Westerheijden, Rip and Van Vught 1991 for the
Netherlands; Anderson 1994 on the UK; Teich 1994 on the USA). In Europe
this move towards evaluation of all university basic research – not just a part of
it in the form of grant request from research councils, as happens ‘everywhere’
– shows especially in the United Kingdom and in the Netherlands (see also
Irvine, Martin and Isard 1990; Brennan 1994; Hammond and Devine 1994;
Hanson 1994; Teich 1994). The British ‘research assessment exercises’ are
directly tied to governmental research funding: a single, summative rating of
a unit’s past research performance determines how much research money the
government will allot to it for the next period. The units in the lowest category
will not receive any ‘untied’ money for research. Whether such concentration
of research funds in a small number of higher education institutions really
enhances research quality is debated (Johnston 1994). And other unintended
consequences also show, most negatively worded as the growth of a ‘compli-
ance culture’, i.e. trying to ‘beat the system’ by concentrating on ways to get
a higher rating without caring about real quality enhancement, for example
by hiring highly published researchers just before such a national assessment
exercise.
In the Netherlands – the country I shall concentrate on in this article –
the government tried to re-establish a self-regulative higher education system
under state auspices, without such a direct link to funding.2 The aim of this
article is to see which effects the Dutch approach has to evaluation of research
quality, especially from the point of view of how university managers can use
the evaluation outcomes.
Evaluation of research quality in Dutch universities since the 1980s
One of the most ubiquitous forms of evaluation of research quality takes place
in research councils (Rip 1994). These councils distribute grants for individ-
ual research projects, sometimes also for larger entities, but the individual
research projects are the main paradigm of their work. In the Netherlands,
this research council is the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research
(NWO). The evaluations concern the quality of applications, which as a rule
pertain to plans for individual research projects or programmes (extensively
explained in: Van de Kaa 1994).
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In the 1980s, the Dutch government wanted to ‘promote both quality and
systematic discussion of priorities and the use of resources’ in research in
Dutch universities (Spaapen et al. 1988: p. i) – accountability regarding gov-
ernment funding can be seen as an ulterior goal (Bijleveld and Goedegebuure
1989: p. 101). For this goal, the NWO evaluations were not sufficient, because
they covered only a small part of university research, and because they looked
at quality project by project, without explicitly taking into account the devel-
opment of a scientific field, or of Dutch higher education.3 Most funding for
research until then was given by the government unconditionally, as part of
the basic grant to the universities, which primarily depended on the number
of students at the university: the more students, the more research funds. A
new policy was introduced in 1983 to change this situation, the so-called
Conditional Funding policy.
To enable a discussion of priorities, the numerous research projects first of
all had to be collected into a smaller number of larger ‘research programmes’
under the Conditional Funding policy. ‘Programme’ was not necessarily used
in Lakatos’s ‘refined falsificationist’ meaning of the word (Lakatos 1970
[1974]), i.e. a coherent set of theories and their connected research problems,
but covered any grouping of research projects under a common heading:
In some disciplines a long tradition of “programming”, of developing
clearly structured and planned research projects and programmes, made
adherence to the rules of the conditional financing relatively easy. Some
critics claimed that these rules were based on how research in the natural
and technical sciences is carried out, and showed little appreciation for the
different ways of working of the humanities and social sciences. (Spaapen
et al. 1988: pp. ii–iii)
The other goal, to promote the quality of research, was to be pursued
through external evaluations of these research programmes, which, after an
introductory period of five years, might have consequences for the univer-
sities’ research funding. These evaluations should use a three-point scale
(‘excellent’ – ‘satisfactory’ – ‘unsatisfactory’), and should lead to research
funding reallocation: good research was to be given priority in funding, taking
it away from bad research programmes (it was, after all, a conditional funding
policy).
But evaluators in fact refused to single out excellent research, and only
very few unsatisfactory programmes were identified, leading to a very low
degree of resource reallocation. The most important effect of the Conditional
Funding procedure, from my present vantage point, has been the introduction
of the research programme as the main level of thought about research within
the universities.
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As a further development of the Conditional Funding procedure, in the early
1990s the coverage of research evaluations was extended to – in principle – all
research in the universities, except contract research. Since the Association
of Universities in the Netherlands (VSNU) already co-ordinated the quality
assessment of teaching in the universities, it was agreed that it would also
co-ordinate this new procedure. The quality assessment of teaching was partly
modelled on the Conditional Funding procedure, in that it too was based on
evaluating all programmes of study in the country belonging to the same area
of knowledge (loosely: discipline). This approach was now used again to
design the procedure of research quality evaluations, which is applied to the
level of research programmes.4
Briefly, the procedure that the VSNU implements since 1993–1994 is as
follows (VSNU 1993; VSNU 1994):5 in consultation with the deans of the
faculties involved in an area of knowledge, a chairperson is chosen for the
ad hoc peer committee. The chair is usually Dutch, e.g. a recently emeritated
full professor. To assure impartiality, the other team members (four to six,
as a rule) mostly are foreigners, the whole procedure being conducted in
English. The faculties provide the evaluators with information covering all
non-contract research in the faculty during the last five years, giving for each
research group information such as:
 a summary of programme aims,
 content of the programme and main results,
 input of research staff,
 five key publications of the programme,
 a list of all publications,
 other indications of quality and reputation.
Based on this written information, complemented with interviews with the
programme leaders (who as a rule are full professors), and sometimes with
site visits, the peer committee then judges each research programme on four
dimensions:
 quality of output,
 productivity (quantity of output),
 relevance (to the discipline, and where applicable also to technology or
to society), and
 long-term viability.
The judgements are made on a five-point scale, ranging from ‘unsatisfacto-
ry’ to ‘excellent’.6 Next to these four judgements (they are not integrated into
a single score), the committee gives an explanation for its judgements of the
research programme in a few textual statements (often not more than about
half a page in length). In a separate part of its public report, the committee
also judges the faculties, the state of the field as a whole, and each of the sub-
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disciplinary areas against the international state of the art. But the part on the
individual research programmes is read much more, within the universities,
than the general part.
For completeness’ sake, let me add that, as is the case with the quality
assessment of teaching, there is no direct link between the VSNU research
evaluations and governmental expenditure for higher education institutions.
In a separate policy initiative in the early 1990s, the government introduced
the concept of ‘research schools’ in Dutch higher education. These can briefly
be characterised as serving a dual purpose: a) concentration of top-level
research in an area of knowledge, often through inter-university co-operation
(a sizeable ‘centre of excellence’), and b) post-graduate education for the next
generation of researchers by the leading researchers in the national subfield.
Not all researchers can take part in a research school: in principle, only the
best are invited. The same goes for research trainees. Also, research schools
take the programming of research a step further: their plans and programmes
should be really coherent. This implies that strategic choices have to be made
within higher education institutions to initiate a research school in a particular
field of knowledge, to participate in one, or to recognise that the ‘centres of
excellence’ in the country in a particular field are not within one’s own
university. Additional funds are available for research schools, and the Royal
Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW) engages in a ‘recognition’ procedure
for these research schools. As in an accreditation, recognition, which is valid
for a five-year period, is far from a foregone conclusion of the procedure. It
is seen as prestigious to have a research school recognised in which one’s
university is taking the lead, and universities value this highly.
Evaluation of evaluation: the research project
The most extensive research evaluation procedure in the Dutch universities
is the one now operated by the VSNU since 1993. After three years of
experience, the VSNU wished to assess the effects of these evaluations of
research quality in the faculties and universities concerned. To have enough
time for effects to become visible, only the committees involved in the first,
experimental, round of evaluations (1993–1994) were selected for the present
evaluation research.7 With the ‘disturbing factors’ that may blur relationships
between the research judgements and decision-making in such a three-year
interval, and without a clearer definition of the effects to be taken into account
(it was not desired to narrow the range of possible effects in advance too
much), flexibility was the guiding principle for this research project rather
than a tight theoretical and hypothetical design. However, the primary focus
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was on the ‘use’ of the evaluation process and of its outcomes by managers
in faculties and at the central university level.
Accordingly, relevant documents were studied, and – as the core of the
empirical work – open interviews were held with decision-makers at the fac-
ulty (in general the faculty dean or the vice-dean for research) and university
levels (the rector magnificus) in two cases for each of the four evaluation
committees concerned.8 Interviews with faculty and university representa-
tives were held separately (with one exception), to enable different points of
view to be presented unhindered. Apart from ensuring maximum spread over
universities, the cases were chosen ‘blindly’, without knowledge of either
the judgements of the peer committees, or the use and other effects of the
evaluations. Respondents, especially at the university level, tended to answer
the questions drawing upon all of their experiences with the VSNU research
evaluations, making their responses more generally relevant than just for the
committees officially involved in the research project.
Use and other effects
Passive and active use
Given the primary interest in ‘use’, but with a broader interest in ‘effects’,
terms were not to limit the possibility of unexpected findings on beforehand.
Therefore, it was decided to choose a broad categorisation of concepts. First, I
distinguish passive use from active use, in line with Frederiks, Westerheijden
and Weusthof (1994).
Active use is defined as making decisions in which the outcomes of the
research evaluations are an important argument. Within this category, instru-
mental use is seen as decisions directly linked, in intent and in time, with the
evaluation outcomes (judgements and – implied – recommendations), while
incremental use denotes decisions made at a later time (operationally: more
than a year after publication of the VSNU committee evaluation report), or
not directly linked to the evaluation outcomes (Hoey 1995: pp. 38–39). As a
rule, in incremental use the evaluation outcomes are only one among a larger
set of arguments. Instrumental use is what is expected in a simple, linear
decision-making model. In a more complex view of social systems, with iter-
ative decision-making, with a multi-actor perspective and acknowledging the
cultural aspects of behaviour (such as the construction of meaning of research
evaluations), next to active use, passive use should also be expected.
Passive use is, first, at the basis of active use, in that it denotes gaining
knowledge of evaluation outcomes, and perhaps discuss it in meetings, but
not (yet) make any decisions in which the research evaluations play a role.
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Next, passive use can be persuasive use, to convince other actors to make a
certain decision.9 Finally, passive use can be conceptual use; this concerns
the way actors think about their work and their organisation. The latter may
be the most important type of use, because it may open up completely new
frameworks for behaviour of actors in higher education. But it is almost
certainly also the most difficult to discern, because actors may be unaware of
a change in their mental frameworks.
Some other effects
Although the primary focus of the research project is on managerial use of
the research quality evaluations, I realise that other effects result from the
evaluation process as well as from the evaluation outcomes. While maintain-
ing the focus on actors within the higher education institutions (effects on
governmental actors, and systems-level effects remain out of my reach), a
number of possible areas of effects are distinguished. The choice of areas is
based on insights from higher education studies, sociology of science, and
organisation theories (Goedegebuure and Westerheijden 1991: p. 515; Van
der Meulen et al. 1991; Spaapen et al. 1988; Whitley 1984; Becher 1989;
O’Neill and Meek 1994: p. 99, among others).
The main point here is that research in a university setting is a social
process, in which researchers depend on colleagues and administrators for
input (knowledge to build upon, money and facilities to work with, etc.),
for throughput (especially in co-operative research projects), and for output
(e.g., places to publish research outcomes). The feedback part of the process
consists of peers’ comparison of reputations, leading to awards, money and
other inputs for a new round of research (Latour and Woolgar 1979: p. 201).
The degree of dependence of researchers on others varies across disciplines
(Whitley 1984; Becher 1989), but might be affected by changes in bound-
ary conditions, some of which are aimed at by the policy initiatives studied
here. Therefore, most of the areas mentioned below are connected to the
researchers’ dependence on other actors, and on the consequences for rela-
tionships between researchers and these other actors (mainly the managers of
the higher education institutions). The areas distinguished are:
a) co-operation among researchers within faculties;
b) research praxis, especially publication behaviour;
c) the relationships between and among researchers, programme leaders,
faculty managers and university managers;
d) quality policies at faculty and university levels;
e) faculty and university management, especially internal resource alloca-
tion, personnel policy and coherence within research programmes;
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f) the position of research groups, faculties and universities vis-a`-vis exter-
nal actors (especially third party funding: research councils and commer-
cial enterprises);
g) finally – tentatively – whether improvement of quality of research can be
discerned.
Findings I: Types of use
Passive use
Management of research quality in Dutch universities has considerably
increased since the early 1980s. External incentives triggered this change:
first the Conditional Funding procedure, then the VSNU research evalua-
tions and the research schools. The Conditional Funding procedure led to a
greater degree of programming of research, and although the evaluations of
programme quality were not very successful per se, they helped prepare the
ground for evaluation (cf. also Spaapen et al. 1988). Excellence now can be
shown, which is new in the traditionally egalitarian Dutch culture.
In all cases that were investigated the VSNU evaluations lead to some
types of use, both passive and active. Passive use is a necessary prerequisite
for active use, because one cannot act upon something without knowing
about it. Passive, formal use is part of the standard operating procedures of
all universities investigated. This takes the form of incorporating the VSNU
evaluation reports in the regular talks between the Faculty Board (dean) and
the university’s Governing Board. If the VSNU research evaluations are seen
as an innovation, this testifies to their ‘compatibility’, one of the factors
enhancing an innovation’s chances for success (Rogers 1983: pp. 220–221).
But passive use is not confined to administrators: all actors in the universities
see evaluation reports as “hot stuff” (W1)10 to be read immediately: “People
were anxiously waiting for the report . . . It was well-consumed, here” (P2)
. . . and that showed. Some talked about it, others did not.” (W1) The talking
depending on whether one’s own research group was evaluated positively
(W1, P1, P2).
‘Program review is an excellent mechanism for providing a new admin-
istration with unbiased information on the status of each department in the
institution.’ (Mets 1995: pp. 23–24); this applies equally to established admin-
istrators and to other levels of the university. All administrators crave for
unbiased, externally validated information about the standing of their units.
According to the respondents the VSNU research evaluations did not often
bring completely new information to the light: “External judgements legit-
imise what you, as administrator, know” (P2). This external legitimisation of
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reputations may well be the most important function the VSNU research eval-
uations fulfil. The degree of legitimisation depends on the credibility of the
evaluations, which in its turn depends on several factors, the most important
of these being – as appears from the interviews:
a) the reputations of the evaluators and the composition of the evaluation
committee,
b) the fact that these evaluations cover practically all research of the evalu-
ated,
c) the differentiated judgements (on a four- or five-point scale), and
d) the fact that they are public.
The credibility of the judgements also depends on the concurrence between
these judgements and previously existing reputations: in one case, unexpected
and probably unfounded judgements of 10% of a faculty’s research under-
mined the credibility of the judgements of the other 90% (B1); in another case,
on the contrary, the concurrence of most judgements with what was believed
before helped to convince the administrators of the remaining judgements
(W1). The verbal argumentation in the evaluation reports can help to bolster
the judgements’ credibility; again B1 was a contrary case.
Active use
Through legitimising differentiated degrees of quality of research groups, the
VSNU research evaluations for the first time give university administrators the
actual possibility to make decisions that differentiate between research groups
– this is the most important consequence of the legitimisation function. As a
result of the VSNU evaluation report and the talks between the Faculty Board
and the university’s Governing Board, the faculty is in all cases expected to
draw up a plan for action. Here we enter the realm of active use.
Instrumental use, some form of which is found in all cases, can be either
positive (rewards for ‘excellent’ judgements, often in the form of additional
temporary researchers’ posts), or negative (punishments for ‘weak’, some-
times even also for ‘average’ judgements, in the form of different degrees of
restructuring of research groups or their research programmes).11 Some uni-
versities are, until now, somewhat hesitant about giving out positive sanctions,
because they wish to have an overview of all judgements before committing
themselves – being too generous after the first verdict of ‘excellent’ can be
seen as setting a precedent (a.o. B1, G1, W2). Some other universities are in
a process of enlarging their central-level capacity for differentiated funding
allocation (P1, P2).
The borderlines between very good, sufficient and weak groups were drawn
differently in different universities,12 based on institutional aspiration levels,
interpretations of the meaning of the actual wording of the ratings, and with
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some awareness of the unavoidable rests of subjectivity in committee deci-
sions: a ‘4’ could have been a ‘5’, or the other way around, if other persons
had been on the evaluation committee. All respondents agreed, however, that
such a threefold distinction must be made, that at least these three categories
were not too susceptible to subjectivity, and that these judgements should
have positive and negative consequences for institutional decision-making.13
Incremental use seems to be even more common than instrumental use.
Incremental use appears in all kinds of decisions that are somehow connected
to research, resource allocation or personnel policy in the universities. The
VSNU research evaluations imply “pressure on the faculties to tackle even-
tual problems” (B1). The largest decision-making processes I came across
in which these evaluations play a role, concern restructurings of faculties,
usually triggered by diminishing numbers of student enrolments, and guided
by arguments of quality of research groups. The central role of quality in
all these decisions should not overshadow other arguments that also play a
role. As a rule, rectors and deans said they based their management decisions
on strategy, profile and quality. Sometimes, the role departments play in the
teaching of a faculty is a reason to protect research groups that perform less
than satisfactory.
A decision of major importance for the profile and quality of a faculty occurs
when a new professor can be appointed; in those, only partly foreseeable,
occasions the VSNU research evaluation reports are often consulted, both for
a view of the profile of the faculty and where possible to get some insight into
the quality and productivity of candidates for the post.14
As a type of incremental use ex ante one could distinguish anticipato-
ry use. Respondents recognised that knowing that their research would be
evaluated has a “preventive effect” (P2), it “keeps things in order” (G1) and
“prevents introversion” (W1). Anticipatory use includes ameliorative action
before an evaluation committee comes, but may also imply the (inadvertent or
strategic?) mixing of weaker research through stronger groups, making weak
research less conspicuous, or even leaving some parts of research completely
out of the evaluation procedure.15
Finally in this section, it should be mentioned that the evaluation results
also become known outside of academe. The judgements produce a “halo
effect” (B1) on professors’ reputations in society, leading to, e.g., changes
in earning capacity on the contract research and development market, even
though the judgements are intended as purely scientific judgements.16
Conceptual use
In some cases, respondents mentioned that “For us, not much has changed.
All our research was judged positively” (P2).17 Meanwhile, in this particular
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faculty ‘excellent’ research groups were given preferential treatment in grant
proposals, and leaders of research groups that were ‘just’ ‘good’ wonder how
they can get a ‘5’ next time – thought and behaviour have changed in this
faculty, apparently without the respondent noticing. This is an example of
conceptual use, and simultaneously of the difficulty to pinpoint it empirically.
The conceptual breakthrough, I gather from the interviews nevertheless,
resulted from the Conditional Funding procedure in the 1980s; that policy
changed the complete discours of research and its management. The Condi-
tional Funding procedure also popularised the notion that research projects
can be collected into programmes, and that such programmes could be used for
management decisions. Also, it loosened the traditional administrative axiom
of qualitative homogeneity a little, but still the differentiated reputations,
which of course existed, were not sufficiently legitimised for administrative
decision-making. In this respect the VSNU research evaluations were more
effective than the Conditional Funding, as explained above (cf. also Spaapen
et al. 1988).
Findings II: Effects on what?
To get a view of other effects of the VSNU research evaluations than their
use in university management, I shall now elaborate the areas of possible
effects mentioned above. As these areas only make up the secondary level of
attention of this research project, I treat them more sketchily than use of the
evaluation.
Co-operation among researchers
The degree of co-operation between researchers to a large extent depends
on characteristics of the discipline (cf. Whitley 1984). Evaluation procedures
cannot influence such compelling reasons very much. Yet, as mentioned in the
previous section, the Conditional Funding procedure popularised the notion of
research programmes, and introduced them even in disciplines without such
traditions, especially in the social sciences and the humanities. At present,
the most important structuring element in co-operation among researchers
are the research schools. Accordingly, I conclude that the interdependence
of researchers has grown during the last ten to fifteen years, but that the
VSNU evaluations do not play an important role in this respect, because other
policies affect this area more.
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Publication behaviour
In view of publication habits, the VSNU research evaluations continue the
trend started with the Conditional Funding. The pressure to publish, and to
publish ever more ‘strategically’ in international (English-language) journals
with high impact factors according to the ISI indices, increases in all types of
disciplines (especially clear in W1, G2). Researchers’ publication behaviour
becomes more and more consciously strategic.
Relationships between and among university actors
The most important function of the VSNU research evaluations is to increase
the legitimacy to make differentiated decisions – it is not a new tool for univer-
sity managers, but a way to make existing tools effective (see also the next two
subsections). In this way, the balance of power within universities is changed
in favour of administrators, both at the faculty and the university levels. This
brief conclusion indicates a very important change in academic processes;
it signals the change from what traditionally was a fragmented university
dominated by the chair-holders,18 to an ever more administratively integrated
organisation – a tendency, in Kogan’s words, towards ‘managerialism’.
Quality policies at faculty and university levels
The VSNU research evaluations for the first time effectively enable the design
and implementation of differentiated quality policy at faculty and university
levels. Thus, they provide an impetus to the development of quality policies,
as can be seen also in the previous and next sections.
The effort that it takes to prepare one’s faculty for the external evaluation
committee is sometimes mentioned as a burden, but less often than when the
self-evaluations for assessments of teaching are concerned (cf. Frederiks et al.
1994). In combination, however, the VSNU research evaluations, evaluations
by the Royal Academy of Arts and Sciences, by the National Organisation
for Scientific Research, by other research councils, etc. (not to mention the
quality assessment of teaching), are felt to produce an ‘evaluation overload’
that limits the acceptability of all these quality management activities for
‘normal’ academics. This may become a serious problem, as acceptance of
quality evaluations by the academics is a crucial factor in their effectiveness
concerning quality improvement. How to minimise the burden of evalua-
tion while stimulating information-based management for improvement and
simultaneously discharging the accountability demanded by government and
society, is as yet an unsolved question.
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Faculty and university management
The VSNU research evaluations in themselves are not new management tools,
but they enable the use of other management tools. In most cases, until now
no new tools were developed: the possibilities given by the regular talks
taking place between the management of the university and of the faculty (a
standard operation procedure in all Dutch universities) appear to be sufficient.
The importance of such talks has increased, however, through the additional
legitimised information that is now available about research performance.
Accordingly, they tend to lead to more managerial activity than before in the
faculties, mainly through ‘action plans’ that are regularly required of them by
the university management to follow up on the negative (and positive) VSNU
judgements.
In some cases, however, more modern management tools are introduced,
such as management contracts or multi-year covenants between a university
and its faculties.19
Direct consequences of evaluation outcomes for governmental funding of
universities do not exist in the Netherlands, and are not desired by respondents.
Research councils and the Royal Academy, it is reasoned by some respon-
dents, can afford to link their project evaluations with finances, because for
a large part of their research universities can always fall back on their basic
government grants. But if the governmental grant itself would become inse-
cure, an ‘English situation’ would arise: in the United Kingdom, the research
assessment exercise may lead to a complete loss of research funds for a fac-
ulty. The complete loss of a secure stream of research funds would seriously
undermine the Humboldtian unity of research and teaching, it is felt, and thus
threaten the basic distinction between universities and other types of higher
education institutions.
Until now, the quality assessment of teaching programmes and the evalu-
ation of research, both co-ordinated by the VSNU, are separate procedures.
Some faculty and university managers regret that in this way they may get
incompatible signals about a faculty and they therefore advocate an integrated
approach.
Position vis-a`-vis external actors
Universities do not actively disseminate the evaluation reports outside of the
institution. The existence of such reports in itself is a proof of transparency of
the higher education sector (B1); whether this improves the social appreciation
of the higher education sector remains an open question.
In this way, it appears from the present research project that universities
do not actively try to influence individual external actors through the reports.
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A “halo effect” nevertheless exists, affecting professors’ reputation in the
eyes of external actors, which influences their earning capacity for contract
research, consultancy, etc.
Improvement of quality?
The ‘proof of the pudding’ of research quality evaluation is whether improve-
ment of quality can be discerned. The present research project cannot answer
this question definitively; it would be hubris for any single researcher to
try to do so. It is clear, however, that the continued existence of ‘weak’,
non-publishing researchers cannot remain hidden any more from le regard
d’autrui because of the public evaluation reports. It would not seem to be
too speculative to expect that as a result of that, non-publishing researchers
would be ‘weeded out’ in the long run. Whether more publishing researchers,
hence more publications, also means better science, is quite a different mat-
ter. However, the drive towards better research seems to be a consequence of
external evaluations. In the words of one respondent – with a catch at the end:
Research leaders are thinking about how they can score better next time.
Because some were disappointed to be not ‘excellent’ but just ‘good’.
Others were relieved by the same score (P2).
Conclusion
The VSNU research evaluations have gained a place in the management of
universities in the Netherlands. They are not the first policy initiative in this
area, because there was the Conditional Funding procedure that started in
1982, nor are they at present the only policy initiative structuring the uni-
versities’ research management, because there are also the research schools.
The ‘niche’ that the VSNU research evaluations occupy is that they give the
most comprehensive judgements of research within the universities; more-
over, they do this in a way that is accepted as valid throughout academe. In
this way, the VSNU research evaluations provide managers or administrators
of Dutch universities with the solid base of legitimacy necessary for them to
make decisions. As one respondent said it: “You almost cannot do without
them any more” (G1).
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Notes
1 In this article I use ‘science’ in its broad, Continental meaning, to denote all types of scholarly
research, encompassing the physical and life sciences as well as medicine, engineering, social
sciences and humanities.
2 The same difference of approaches between these two countries can be found in the quality
assessments of teaching, cf. Goedegebuure, Maassen and Westerheijden 1990 or Westerheij-
den, Maassen and Brennan 1994.
3 The advisory mechanisms to forecast and influence developments of scientific fields in the
Netherlands included permanent advisory boards to the Minister of Education and Sciences,
such as the Advisory Council for Science Policy (RAWB), and temporary ‘forecast commit-
tees’ (see Martin and Irvine 1989; Van der Meulen et al. 1991).
4 Since in some cases these programmes are indistinguishable from the departments (‘vak-
groepen’) performing them, I shall mostly use the neutral term ‘research group’ throughout
this text.
5 The following is general enough to apply to all of the VSNU’s regular research evaluations,
although minor adaptations were made in 1994 after the first, pilot, year. In details, the commit-
tees may deviate from this ‘general protocol’ through ‘discipline protocols’. Exceptions to this
standard VSNU evaluation procedure are some ‘orchids’ (faculties without equivalents in the
Netherlands) whose teaching and research have been evaluated simultaneously. Moreover, a
large-scale experiment with such integrated evaluation takes place in 1997 for the programmes
in language and literature.
6 However, in the first year, which is studied here, the procedure was still being experimented;
e.g. four- and five-point scales were used, and the number and wording of the dimensions
was not uniform across committees. One evaluation committee in humanities refused to use
explicit judgement scales, but if one studied the report closely, one could read that “Saul hath
slain his thousands, and David his ten thousands” (as one respondent quoted Samuel 1, 18: 7
in an interview).
7 The procedure itself was evaluated immediately after the first year, leading to relatively
minor changes in the VSNU research evaluation procedure as it functioned from 1994 onwards
(Werkgroep Kwaliteitszorg Onderzoek 1994). I assume that the effects of the evaluation are
not affected by this adaptation of the procedure.
8 In three of the university-level interviews and in one faculty, respondents were members of
the permanent staff of these decision-makers. The two cases of mechanical engineering were
in technical universities, the six others (biology, psychology and history) involved six general
universities.
9 As persuasive use empirically surfaces in active use, if it is addressed to other actors within the
university, I shall not discuss persuasion separately, but see also the section ‘Position vis-a`-vis
external actors’.
10 Quotes from interview transcripts will be put between double quotation marks followed by
a code of the case in parentheses. Translations by the author – except for “hot stuff”, which
was said in English. Note that there were two respondents in each case; quotes and codes thus
do not coincide with individual respondents.
11 As dismissing individual researchers is very difficult in practice, negative and positive sanc-
tions are mostly those, on a collective level, mentioned above.
12 Only in one university was it completely left to the individual faculties to decide on their
own standards of quality. In the others, either the Governing Board had its factual standards,
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or decided in consultation with the faculty concerned which research groups needed positive
or negative sanctions.
13 Respondents did not all agree about which dimension of judgements is crucial; quality of
output (as in case P2), a group’s viability (as in W2), or both (as in G2). None mentioned
productivity or relevance.
14 Although the judgements pertain to research groups, names of the group leaders (as a rule
full professors) are mentioned in the VSNU reports.
15 Clearly there are university-internal visions about strong and weak research before external
evaluations take place, sometimes but not always based on a tradition of internal research
evaluations.
16 The theoretical importance of reputation in diminishing the need for extensive information
as a base for behaviour has been stressed before (Stigler 1961; Lieshout 1995; Westerheijden
1988).
17 As an aside, it is interesting to note that many respondents have formed a general, coherent
view of research quality in their institution – usually one that was ‘better than average’ – even
though the actual VSNU research evaluations are on the level of basic research groups or
programmes, and practically always range from very positive to very negative between units
within each faculty. Does this tendency arise out of psychological parsimony or necessity, or
does it grow from persuasive purposes?
18 It may be good to remember here Waltz’s (1979: p. 58) observation that: ‘A subsystem
dominant system is no system at all’, with all its advantages and disadvantages.
19 Note that on a national scale, at least until 1996, budgets in the Netherlands are single-year
budgets, without certainty for next years, contrary to the Swedish and French multi-year con-
tracts between national ministry and universities.
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